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A truly human interface: interacting
face-to-face with someone whose
words are determined
by a computer program
Kevin Corti* and Alex Gillespie
Department of Social Psychology, London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK
We use speech shadowing to create situations wherein people converse in person with
a human whose words are determined by a conversational agent computer program.
Speech shadowing involves a person (the shadower) repeating vocal stimuli originating
from a separate communication source in real-time. Humans shadowing for conversa-
tional agent sources (e.g., chat bots) become hybrid agents (“echoborgs”) capable of
face-to-face interlocution. We report three studies that investigated people’s experiences
interacting with echoborgs and the extent to which echoborgs pass as autonomous
humans. First, participants in a Turing Test spoke with a chat bot via either a text interface
or an echoborg. Human shadowing did not improve the chat bot’s chance of passing
but did increase interrogators’ ratings of how human-like the chat bot seemed. In our
second study, participants had to decide whether their interlocutor produced words
generated by a chat bot or simply pretended to be one. Compared to those who engaged
a text interface, participants who engaged an echoborg were more likely to perceive their
interlocutor as pretending to be a chat bot. In our third study, participants were naïve to
the fact that their interlocutor produced words generated by a chat bot. Unlike those who
engaged a text interface, the vast majority of participants who engaged an echoborg did
not sense a robotic interaction. These findings have implications for android science, the
Turing Test paradigm, and human–computer interaction. The human body, as the delivery
mechanism of communication, fundamentally alters the social psychological dynamics of
interactions with machine intelligence.
Keywords: android science, cyranoid, dialog systems, embodiment, human–computer interaction, speech shad-
owing, Turing Test, uncanny valley
Introduction
“Meaning is the face of the Other, and all recourse to words takes place already within the
primordial face to face of language”
(Levinas, 1991, p. 206).
In comparison to other forms of interaction, face-to-face communication between humans is
characterized by more social emotion, higher demands for comprehensibility, and increased social
obligation; the face of the other commands an ethical relation that is absent in people’s interaction
with “things” (Levinas, 1991). Face-to-face, close-proximity interaction between tangible bodies is
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the primordial human inter-face and is the format of exchange
most conducive for shared understanding (Linell, 2009). Com-
puter technologies specifically designed to simulate human social
functioning (e.g., conversational agents) have to date communi-
cated with people via technical interfaces such as screens, buttons,
robotic devices, avatars, interactive voice response systems, and
so on. This leaves a need to explore human perception of and
interactionwith these technologies under conditions that replicate
the full complexity of face-to-face human–human communica-
tion. The present article introduces a means of doing so. We
demonstrate a methodology that allows a person to interact “in
the flesh” with a conversational agent whose interface is an actual
human body.
Contemporary Android Science
Android science aims to develop artificial systems identical to
humans in both appearance and behavior (verbal and non-verbal)
for the purposes of exploring human nature and investigating
the ways in which these systems might integrate into human
society (MacDorman and Ishiguro, 2006a; Ishiguro and Nishio,
2007). The field is as interested in better understanding people
through their interacting with anthropomorphic technology as
it is in further developing the technology itself. Considerable
progress has beenmade in these endeavors, with perhaps themost
notable work being that undertaken and inspired byHiroshi Ishig-
uro of Osaka University’s Intelligent Robotics Laboratory, whose
research and engineering teams have developed highly lifelike
autonomous and semi-autonomous androids. MacDorman and
Ishiguro (2006b) argue that in being controllable, programmable,
and replicable, androids are in certain respects superior to human
actors as social and cognitive experimental stimuli. They further
contend that androids can evoke in humans expectations and
emotions that attenuate the psychological barrier between people
and machines.
The motor behaviors of autonomous androids are controlled
by technologies that perceive and orient to the physical environ-
ment while their speech is controlled by a conversational agent.
As autonomous technologies are still quite limited in terms of
functionality, the social capacities of these types of androids are
severely constrained. Tele-operated androids, meanwhile, over-
come the limitations of fully autonomous models by-way-of a
human operator controlling the android’s speech and movement
(Nishio et al., 2007b). On account of their enhanced social capa-
bilities, tele-operated androids have stimulated ample research in
psychology and other domains of social and cognitive science.
For instance, researchers have investigated the extent to which a
person’s presence with remote others is amplified or weakened
when tele-operating an android compared to when communicat-
ing in person or via more distal technological mediators such as
video conferencing (Nishio et al., 2007a; Sakamoto et al., 2007).
Researchers have also explored the extent to which tele-operators
perceive their android to be extensions of themselves, sensing
physical stimuli administered to the android as if the stimuli had
been administered to their own body (Ogawa et al., 2012). Perhaps
the most discussed phenomenon in the field of android science is
the “uncanny valley,” posited by Mori (1970). This idea suggests
that the affinity a person has for an artificial agent will increase
as the appearance and motor behavior of the agent becomes
more human-like; however, at a certain point along the human-
likeness continuum (where the agent begins to look more or less
human but for slight, yet telling, signs of artificiality) feelings of
affinity will sharply decline, before rapidly rising again as the agent
becomes indistinguishable from an actual human (MacDorman
and Ishiguro, 2006b; Seyama and Nagayama, 2007).
We propose inverting the composition of tele-operated android
systems in order to create hybrid entities consisting of a human
whose words (and potentially motor actions) are entirely or par-
tially determined by a computer program.We refer to such hybrids
as “echoborgs,” which can be classified as a type of “cyranoid”—
Milgram’s (2010) term for a hybrid composed of a person who
speaks the words of a separate person in real-time. Echoborgs can
be used to examine the role of the human body, as the delivery
mechanism of communication, in mediating social emotions,
attributions, and other interpersonal phenomena emergent in
face-to-face interaction. Furthermore, echoborgs can be used to
evaluate the performance and perception of artificial conversa-
tional agents under conditions wherein people assume they are
interacting with an autonomously communicating human being.
To ground these claims, however, we shall first discuss the tools
and constraints of contemporary android science in order to
identify where echoborg methodology can contribute.
The Challenge of Creating Androids that Speak
Autonomously
Examples of autonomous androids includeReplieeQ1 andRepliee
Q2, which were developed jointly by Osaka University and the
KokoroCorporation (see Ishiguro, 2005; Ranky andRanky, 2005).
Because androids of this nature attempt to replicate humans at
both an outer/physical level as well as an inner/dispositional level,
they can be evaluated against what Harnad (1991) defined as the
Total Turing Test (also referred to as the Robotic Turing Test;
Harnad, 2000), which establishes the entire repertoire of human
linguistic and sensorimotor abilities as the appropriate criteria for
judging machine imitations of human intelligence. The develop-
ment of an autonomous android capable of passing such a test,
however, remains a distant holy grail.
One source of current constraints concerns how artificial agents
in general interpret and participate in dialog. Various terminolo-
gies describe technology that interacts with humans via natural
language. “Dialog system,” “conversational agent,” and “conver-
sational AI,” for instance, are terms used to denote the linguistic
subsystems of artificial agents, though no clear consensus exists
with regard to how non-overlapping these and other terms are.
“Conversational agent,” the term we have employed thus far,
is perhaps the most convenient term for conceptualizing the
echoborg because it has been adopted by a parallel project—the
development of embodied conversational agents (software that
interfaces through onscreen anthropomorphic avatars). Much of
the literature that distinguishes the functionality of various lin-
guistic subsystems, however, couches these technologies as dialog
systems. Types of dialog systems include high-level systems of
integrated artificial intelligence that employ advanced learning
and reasoning algorithms enabling a user and amachine to jointly
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accomplish specific tasks within a formal dialog structure (e.g.,
logistics and navigation planning agents), low-level systems that
use basic algorithms to simply mimic, rather than understand,
casual human conversation (e.g., web-based “chat bots”), and
mid-level systems that strike a balance between high-level and
low-level functionality (e.g., agents designed to field queries from
and respond to pedestrians in transit centers; for a discussion
of dialog system hierarchy, see Schumaker et al., 2007). Dialog
systems can also be differentiated in terms of the level of initiative
they take when interacting with users (Zue and Glass, 2000).
System-initiative agents are those that control the parameters of
dialog and elicit information from the user that must be compati-
ble with certain response formats (e.g., interactive voice response
telephone systems). User-initiative agents, on the other hand, are
those in which the user presents queries to a passive agent (e.g.,
Apple’s Siri application). Mixed-initiative agents (by far the least
developed variety;Mavridis, 2015) involve both the user and agent
taking active roles in a joint task with the nature of dialog being
qualitatively more conversational relative to other types of dialog
systems.
If we treat, as Turing (1950) did, discourse capacity as a
basic proxy for an interlocutor’s “mind,” then even today’s most
advanced dialog system technologies render available to artificial
agents such as androids minds that are at best starkly non-human
(though potentially very powerful), and atworst extremely impov-
erished relative to that of humans. Though contemporary high-
level andmid-level dialog systems are indeed impressive and their
functionality continues to expand rapidly, they are not, in princi-
ple, attempts tomimic a human interlocutor capable of casual con-
versation. On the contrary, they are presently intended to interact
with humans in specific domains and generally do not operate
outside of these contexts (e.g., such a system cannot spontaneously
switch from being a logistics planning agent to having a con-
versation about an ongoing basketball game). No human would
be expected to communicate in a manner similar to these types
of artificial intelligence, nor are humans necessarily constrained
in terms of only being capable of communicating from within
a fixed and narrow language-game. System-initiative and user-
initiative agents also deviate from the norms of human–human
interaction as they grant to one interlocutor total and unbreakable
communicative control.
Though we can perhaps imagine high-level and mid-level dia-
log systems capable of engaging humans in casual conversation
someday being ubiquitous throughout social robotics, at present
only certain low-level and primarily text-based systems are engi-
neered specifically for this purpose. An early but well known
example of such a system is ELIZA, a chat bot with the persona of
a Rogerian psychotherapist (Weizenbaum, 1966). Modern exam-
ples include A.L.I.C.E. (Artificial Linguistic Internet Chat Entity;
Wallace, 2015), Cleverbot (Carpenter, 2015), Mitsuku (Worswick,
2015), and Rose (Wilcox, 2015). Many chat bots make use of the
highly customizable AIML (Artificial Intelligence Markup Lan-
guage) XML dialect developed by Wallace (2008) and operate by
recognizing word patterns delivered by a user and matching them
to response templates defined by the bot’s programmer. Increas-
ingly sophisticated mechanisms for generating response corpora
have been developed for chat bots in recent years. For instance,
some developers have turned to real-time crowdsourcing of online
communication repositories, such as Twitter and Facebook, as a
means of producing responses appropriate for a given user input
(see Mavridis et al., 2010; Bessho et al., 2012).
Chat bots are widely available on the internet and feature reg-
ularly in events such as the annual Loebner Prize competition
(Loebner, 2008), a contest held to determine which chat bot
performs most successfully on a Turing Test. This test involves a
human interrogator simultaneously communicating via text with
twohidden interlocutorswhile attempting to uncoverwhich of the
two is a bot andwhich is a real person. To date, no chat bot has reli-
ably passed as a human being, and we are unlikely to see this feat
accomplished in the near future (Dennett, 2004; French, 2012).
Generally, human interactions with chat bots fail to arrive at
what conversation analysts refer to as “anchor points”: mutu-
ally attended to topics of shared focus that establish an implicit
“center of gravity” during moments of conversation following
routine canonical openings (Schegloff, 1986; Friesen, 2009). As
chat bots tend to be user-initiative agents, they cannot engage
in the type of fluid mixed-initiative conversation that is natural
to mundane human–human interaction (Mavridis, 2015). Chat
bots demonstrate a poor capacity to reason about conversation,
cannot consistently identify and repair misunderstandings, and
generally talk at an entirely superficial level (Perlis et al., 1998;
Shahri and Perlis, 2008). According to Raine (2009), many chat
bots work “based on an assumption that the basic components
of a communication are on a phrase-by-phrase basis and that
the most immediate input will be the most relevant stimulus for
the upcoming output” (p. 399), an operative model that can lead
conversation to irreparably fall apart when the perspectives of
parties to a conversation diverge in terms of themeaning or inten-
tion each party assigns to an utterance. Human communication
is fundamentally temporal and sequential, with many past and
possible future utterances feeding into the meaning of a given
utterance (Linell, 2009).
Developing acoustic technology that can accurately perceive
spoken discourse remains a related challenge. The error rate of
speech recognition technology is dramatically compounded by,
among other things, variation in a speaker’s accent, the lengthiness
and spontaneity of their speech, their use of contextually specific
vocabulary, the presence of multiple and overlapping speakers,
speech speed, and so on (Pieraccini, 2012). Thus, speech recog-
nition systems within artificial agents perform best not when
discerning casual conversational dialog, but when discerning brief
and predictable utterances. Microphone array technologies and
software capable of identifying and isolating multiple speakers
continue to improve (e.g., the “HARK” robot audition system;
Nakadai et al., 2010; Mizumoto et al., 2011), but demonstrations
of these systems have essentially involved stationary apparatuses
confined to laboratory environments.
Tele-Operated Androids: Mechanical Bodies,
Human Operators
Tele-operated androids were developed in part to overcome
a social research bottleneck within android science born of
the various limitations of conversational agents and perception
technologies (Nishio et al., 2007b; Watanabe et al., 2014). They
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thus constitute a methodological trade-off: rather than being both
physically artificial and having computer-controlled behavior (a
combination that currently results in poor social functioning), the
tele-operated paradigm cedes behavioral control to a human and
in doing so augments the speech and motor capabilities of the
android.
Perhaps the most well-known tele-operated android is Gemi-
noid HI-1, a robot modeled in the likeness of its creator, Hiroshi
Ishiguro. From a remote console, the tele-operator is able to
transmit their voice through the geminoid (derived from the
Latin word “geminus,” meaning “double”) while software analyz-
ing video footage of the tele-operator’s body and lip movements
replicate this motor behavior in the geminoid. The tele-operator
can also manually control specified behaviors such as nodding
and gaze-direction. Video monitors and microphones capture the
audio-visual perspective of the geminoid and transmit to the
tele-operation console, allowing the tele-operator to observe the
geminoid’s social environment (Nishio et al., 2007b; Becker-Asano
et al., 2010).
Relative to their fully-autonomous counterparts, the enhanced
conversational capacities of tele-operated androids allow
researchers to study communicatively rich human–android
interactions as well as offer a means of operationally separating
the behavioral control unit of an agent (the tele-operator) from
the body, or interface, of the agent (the android). As Nishio et al.
(2007b) contend:
“The strength of connection, or what kind of information is
transmitted between the body and mind, can be easily recon-
figured. This is especially important when taking a top-down
approach that adds/deletes elements froma person to discover
the “critical elements” that comprise human characteristics”
(p. 347).
These methodological assets have inspired an abundance of
exploratory laboratory and field work in recent years. Abildgaard
and Scharfe (2012), for instance, used Geminoid-DK to con-
duct university lectures and reported on how perceptions of the
android differed between male and female students. Research
involving android-mediated conversations between parents and
children has explored to what extent children sense the personal
presence of a tele-operator (Nishio et al., 2008). Straub et al. (2010)
studied how tele-operators and those they communicate with
jointly construct the social identity of an android. Dougherty and
Scharfe (2011), meanwhile, explored whether touch influences a
person’s trust in a tele-operated android.
Despite the progress and promise of tele-operated androids,
this line of research faces particular constraints. The non-verbal
behaviors of autonomous and semi-autonomous androids are
more mechanical and less fluid relative to humans. In their neu-
roimaging analysis of how people perceive geminoid movement,
Saygin et al. (2012) show how incongruity between appearance
(human-like) and motion (non-human-like) implicitly violates
people’s expectations. Developing tools for matching an android’s
bodily movements to those of its tele-operator is a major research
priority (Nishio et al., 2007b), and improving techniques for
achieving facial synchrony is particularly necessary given the
intricate facial musculature of humans and the role of facial
expression in conveying emotion and facilitating social inter-
action (Ekman, 1992; Bänziger et al., 2009; for a discussion of
robot emotion conveyance, see Nitsch and Popp, 2014). Cur-
rent anthropomorphic androids are relatively limited in terms of
their capacity for human-like facial expressivity (Becker-Asano,
2011). For instance, Geminoid F’s face can successfully express
the emotions sad, happy, and neutral, but the model struggles to
convincingly convey angry, surprised, and fearful (Becker-Asano
and Ishiguro, 2011). Also, the inexactness of an android’s lip
movements in relation to the words spoken by its tele-operator
has been discussed as possibly degrading the quality of social
interactions (Abildgaard and Scharfe, 2012).Moreover, geminoids
and other android models cannot walk on account of their having
large air compressors facilitating numerous pneumatic actuators
(Ishiguro and Nishio, 2007).
The imperfect appearance of tele-operated androids remains a
barrier to replicating the social psychological conditions of face-
to-face human–human interaction. Despite painstaking efforts
to create realistic silicone android models (Ishiguro and Nishio,
2007), people are minutely attuned to subtle deviations from true
humanness (e.g., eyes that lack glossy wetness). In a field study
conducted to test whether people would notice an inactive or
relatively passive geminoid in a social space, a majority of people
reported having seen a robot in their surroundings (von der
Pütten et al., 2011), a finding which suggests that most people are
not easily fooled into believing an android is an actual person even
in social situations where they do not engage the android directly.
Moreover, though geminoids and other highly anthropomorphic
androids are seen as the most human-like and least unfamiliar of
robot types, people nonetheless perceive these androids as more
threatening than less anthropomorphic models (Rosenthal-von
der Pütten and Krämer, 2014).
There is also an important practical constraint characterizing
the tele-operated and autonomous android paradigms. As Ziemke
and Lindblom (2006) point out, it is quite time consuming and
costly to produce android experimental apparatuses. This raises
issues as to the scalability of the current android science research
model and the extent to which experiments making use of a
particular device in one laboratory can be replicated elsewhere.
The Echoborg
An echoborg is composed of a human whose words (and poten-
tially motor actions) are entirely or partially determined by a
computer program. Echoborgs constitute a methodological trade-
off inverse to that of the tele-operated paradigm discussed above,
as they allow the possibility of studying social interactions with
artificial agents that have truly human interfaces. The unique
affordances of echoborgs can complement those of tele-operated
and fully-autonomous androids and contribute to our under-
standing of the social psychological dynamics of human–agent
interaction.
Speech Shadowing and the Cyranoid Method
The echoborg concept stems from work conducted by Corti and
Gillespie (2015), whose application of Milgram’s (2010) “cyranoid
method” of social interaction demonstrates a means of creating
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of a basic cyranoid interaction. The shadower voices words provided by the source while engaging with the interactant in person.
hybrid human entities via an audio-vocal technique known as
“speech shadowing.” Speech shadowing involves a person (the
shadower) voicing the words of an external source simultaneously
as those words are heard (Schwitzgebel and Taylor, 1980). This
can be facilitated by-way-of an inner-ear monitor worn by the
shadower that receives audio from the source. Research has shown
that native-language shadowers can repeat the words of a source at
latencies as low as a few hundred milliseconds (Marslen-Wilson,
1973, 1985; Bailly, 2003) and can perform the technique while
simultaneously attending to other tasks (Spence and Read, 2003).
Shadowers tend to reflexively imitate certain gestural elements
of their source (e.g., stress, accent, and so on)—a phenomenon
known as “phonetic convergence” (Goldinger, 1998; Shockley
et al., 2004; Pardo et al., 2013).
One finds the use of speech shadowing as a research tool
primarily in psycholinguistics and the study of second-language
acquisition. In the late 1970s, however, Milgram—famous for
his controversial studies on obedience to authority (Milgram,
1974)—began using speech shadowing to investigate social sce-
narios involving people communicating through shadowers. He
saw the technique as a means of pairing sources and shadow-
ers whose identities differed in terms of race, age, gender, and
so on, thus allowing sources to directly experience an interac-
tion in which their outer appearance was markedly transformed
(see Figure 1). From the point of view of the shadower, the
method enabled exploration into the sensation of contributing to
an unscripted conversation not one’s self-authored thoughts, but
entirely those of a remote source. Inspired by the play Cyrano de
Bergerac, the story of a poet (Cyrano) who assists a handsome but
inarticulate nobleman (Christian) in wooing a woman by telling
himwhat to say to her,Milgram referred to these source-shadower
pairs as “cyranoids.”
As speech shadowing proved to be a relatively simple task that
research participants were quick to grasp, Milgram quickly began
exploring a variety of cyranic interactions. For instance, in sev-
eral pilot studies he examined whether “interactants” (Milgram’s
term for those who encountered a cyranoid) would notice if
the source was changed mid-conversation (Milgram, 1977). Mil-
gram (2010) also sourced for 11- and 12-year-old children during
interviews with teachers naïve to the manipulation. Following
these interactions, all of the teachers seemed to take the inter-
views at face value—they neither picked up on the true nature
of the interactions nor sensed that the child they interviewed
had behaved non-autonomously. The teachers had succumbed to
the “cyranic illusion,” that is, the tendency to perceive interlocu-
tors as autonomous communicators and thus fail to notice an
interlocutor that is a cyranoid.
Corti and Gillespie (2015) argue that one of the cyranoid
method’s primary strengths is that it allows the researcher to
manipulate one component of the cyranoid, either the shadower
or the source, while keeping the other component fixed. Thus,
one can study how the same source is perceived when interacting
through a variety of shadower-types. Conversely, a researcher
can opt to keep the shadower constant and vary the identity of
the source across experimental conditions. This capacity mir-
rors the functionality of tele-operated androids as well as similar
methods for studying transformed social interactions (e.g., using
3D immersive virtual environment technology to alter people’s
identities; see Blascovich et al., 2002; Bailenson et al., 2005; Yee
and Bailenson, 2007). A unique benefit of the cyranoid method
is that it allows for in person, face-to-face interactions between
an interactant and a hybrid. When interacting with a cyranoid,
one is not interacting with an onscreen person, or a human-like
machine, or a virtual representation of a human, but with an actual
human body.
While Corti and Gillespie’s (2015) recent work was conducted
in the laboratory, it follows recent field explorations of cyranoids
in experiential art installations (Mitchell, 2009) and as classroom
learning tools (Raudaskoski and Mitchell, 2013). Taken together,
these studies outline a number of basic protocols for constructing
cyranic interactions and discuss the devices necessary for creat-
ing a basic cyranoid apparatus, which involves both a means of
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discreetly transmitting audio from the source to the shadower
as well as a means for the source to hear (and, if possible, see)
the interaction between the shadower and the interactant. The
amalgam of devices one uses toward these requirements depends
upon the type of interaction the researcher wishes to create. For
instance, if a researcherwants to keep hidden from interactants the
fact that a cyranoid is present in an interaction, then the cyranoid
apparatus should be discreet and non-visible/audible to interac-
tants. If the researcher wants the shadower to be mobile, then
the devices that compose the cyranoid apparatus must transmit
wirelessly. Minimizing the audio latency in the communication
loop is crucial to any cyranoid apparatus; interactant!source
and source!shadower audio transfer must be accomplished in a
realistic amount of time.
A cyranic interaction involving a covert cyranoid is typically
accomplished using an apparatus similar to the following. A
wireless “bug” microphone placed near where the shadower and
interactant engage each other transmits to a radio receiver lis-
tened to by the source in an adjacent soundproof room. The
source speaks into amicrophone connected to a short-range radio
transmitter which relays to a receiver worn in the pocket of the
shadower. Connected to the shadower’s receiver is a neck-loop
induction coil worn underneath their clothing. The shadower
wears a wireless, flesh-colored inner-ear monitor that sits in their
ear canal and receives the signal emanating from the induction
coil, allowing the shadower to hear and thus voice the source’s
speech. This amalgam of devices is neither visible nor audible to
interactants.
Ceding Verbal Agency to a Machine
Echoborg methodology takes the original cyranoid model and
replaces the human source with an artificial conversational agent.
The words produced by the conversational agent are thus voiced
and embodied by a human shadower. Echoborgs have at least four
main research affordances:
Interchangeability of Shadowers and Conversational
Agents
Both the shadower and the conversational agent that comprise
an echoborg are easily customizable and interchangeable. The
researcher need only train a confederate with the desired physical
attributes to speech shadow sufficiently and then couple them
with a conversational agent. This gives the researcher the free-
dom to construct many echoborgs, each differentiated from one
another in terms their particular conversational agent, gender,
age, and so on. Thus, one can observe how the same conversational
agent is perceived depending on the identity of the shadower by
holding the conversational agent constant across experimental
conditions and varying the shadower (e.g., female shadower vs.
male shadower). Alternatively, the researcher can hold the shad-
ower constant and vary the conversational agent (e.g., ELIZA vs.
A.L.I.C.E).
Visual Realism
Echoborgs offer a means of studying interactions under condi-
tions where the interactant’s cognitive sense of the interaction is
undistorted by any esthetic, acoustic, non-verbal, or motor non-
humanness of the physical agent they encounter (e.g., lips that do
not exactly align with the words they utter or eyes that do not
perfectly make contact with the interactant’s). Speech shadowing
is not a cognitively demanding task; it is rather simple for a well-
rehearsed speech shadower to attend to other behaviors while
replicating the speech of their source, including matching their
body language to the words they find themselves repeating (e.g.,
shaking their head from side-to-side upon articulating the word
“no”).
Mobility
Echoborgs can take advantage of the shadower’s physical mobil-
ity and need not be confined to stationary interactions—they
can walk or otherwise move about while communicating with
interactants. Human communication did not evolve for having
conversations per se; it evolved for coordinating joint activity
(Tomasello, 2008). Research on everyday language use shows that
communication is a means of doing (Clark, 1996). Accordingly,
mobile echoborgs open up the possibility of testing conversa-
tional agents in the context of performing a joint non-stationary
activity.
Covert Capacity
Taking advantage of the cyranic illusion, echoborgs can interact
with people covertly (i.e., under conditions wherein interactants
assume they are encountering an autonomously communicating
person). This affordance can be juxtaposed with the fact that at
present, those who interact with tele-operated or autonomous
androids are under no illusion that they are interacting with a
fully-autonomous human being. The covert capacity of echoborgs
thus presents a new means of researching interactions with con-
versational agents. It is one thing to evaluate interactions with
conversational agents in contexts where people are cognitively
aware, or at least primed to believe, that they are speaking to
something artificial, but it is entirely different to study these
systems under conditions where the interface one encounters (an
actual human body) creates the visceral impression that one is
dealing with an autonomous person.
Overview of Studies
We conducted three experiments in which participants inter-
acted with echoborgs. These studies explored the ways in which
echoborgs, as human interfaces, mediate the experience of con-
versing with a chat bot in various contexts, as well as the extent
to which echoborgs improve a chat bot’s ability to pass as human
(i.e., be taken for a human rather than a robot). Each study was
approved by an ethics review board at the London School of
Economics and Political Science and conducted at the univer-
sity’s Behavioral Research Laboratory. Adult participants were
recruited online via the university’s research participant recruit-
ment portal and included students from the university, university
employees, and people unaffiliated with the university. Partic-
ipants gave informed consent prior to participation and were
debriefed extensively.
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Study 1: Turing Testing with Echoborgs
Aims
In outlining the logic of his imitation game, Turing (1950) argued
that “there was little point in trying to make a “thinking machine”
more human by dressing it up in such artificial flesh” (p. 434)
and made a clear distinction between what he thought of as
the physical (likeness) and intellectual (functional) capacities of
humans. However, this distinction has been criticized (Harnad,
2000); perceiving the salient bodily characteristics of other entities
is fundamental to how humans infer the subjective states (or lack
thereof) of said entities, be they real or unreal in reality (Graziano,
2013). To explore this tension, our first study investigated a Turing
Test scenario wherein participants were asked to determine which
of two shadowed interlocutors was truly human and which was
a chat bot. Furthermore, we sought to determine whether a chat
bot voiced by a human shadower would be perceived as more
human-like than the same bot communicating via text.
Shadowers and Subjects
Two female graduate students (both aged 23) were trained as
speech shadowers. Eighty-two participants (42 female, mean
age= 28.93, SD= 12.05)were randomly assigned into pairswithin
one of two experimental conditions: Text Interface (n = 21) and
Echoborg (n = 20). One participant within each pair was ran-
domly selected to function as the Turing Test interrogator while
the second participant was designated as the human interlocutor.
In all pairs, participants were both unfamiliar with one another
and unaware of the other’s role in the study.
Procedure
From the interaction room, the researcher instructed the inter-
rogator that the study involved using a text-based instant mes-
saging client (Pidgin) to simultaneously communicate with two
anonymous interlocutors, one of whom was a chat bot (Clever-
bot). The interrogator’s computer showed two separate text-input
windows, one that delivered to “Interlocutor A,” and another
that delivered to “Interlocutor B.” The interrogator was told that
following 10-min of conversation they would be asked which
of these two interlocutors they believed was the real human.
Meanwhile, in a separate room, a research assistant instructed
the human interlocutor that the study involved holding a 10-min
conversation with a stranger and that their task was to simply
respond to messages that appeared on a computer screen. The
human interlocutor was thus blind to the fact that they were
engaged in a Turing Test. Both the interrogator and the human
interlocutor were informed that they were free to discuss any topic
during the interaction so long as nothing was vulgar.
Text Interface Condition
Once instruction was complete, the researcher relocated to a third
room (the source room) where they monitored the interaction
using a computer. Messages that the interrogator typed to Inter-
locutor A were routed to the researcher, who input the received
text into Cleverbot and routed Cleverbot’s response back through
the instant messaging client to the interrogator. Messages the
interrogator sent to Interlocutor B, meanwhile, were routed to
the human interlocutor’s computer, and the human interlocutor
directly responded in text via the instant messaging client.
Echoborg Condition
The interrogator was further instructed that though they would
type messages to Interlocutor A and Interlocutor B via the instant
messaging client, the responses of these two interlocutors would
be spoken aloud by two speech shadowers. The two speech shad-
owers, with shadowing equipment, entered the room, sat side-by-
side facing the interrogator at a distance of roughly six feet, and
it was made known to the interrogator which shadower would
reproduce thewords of InterlocutorA andwhichwould reproduce
the words of Interlocutor B (shadowers alternated between trials
in terms of the interlocutor they were paired to). The interroga-
tor was informed that the shadowers would speak solely words
they received from their respective sources and that at no point
during the interaction would the shadowers speak self-authored
thoughts. Furthermore, the interrogator was informed that both
interlocutors would only respond to typed messages and that
nothing the interrogator spoke aloud would be responded to.
Following these instructions, the researcher relocated to the
source room. As in the Text Interface condition, messages that the
interrogator sent to Interlocutor A were routed to the researcher’s
computer where they were input by the researcher into Cleverbot.
Instead of routing Cleverbot’s responses back to the interrogator
through the instant messaging client, however, the researcher
spoke Cleverbot’s responses into a microphone which relayed to
the speech shadower paired to Interlocutor A, thus allowing them
to hear and repeat Cleverbot’s words to the interrogator. Simi-
larly, the human interlocutor’s typed responses were routed to the
researcher’s computer (rather than directly to the interrogator),
allowing the researcher to speak these messages into a separate
microphone which relayed to the shadower paired to Interlocutor
B (see Figure 2).
Stock Responses
Cleverbot’s response formats are not programmed; Cleverbot ref-
erences past conversations it has heldwith people over the internet
when generating a reply to a given user input (Carpenter, 2015).
Unlike other bots, therefore, Cleverbot has no consistent identity.
Its strength lies in its ability to learn unique ways of respond-
ing. We decided, however, that in order to establish consistency
between experimental trials, three stock responses would be sup-
plied in both conditions to the interrogator in lieu of a response
generated by Cleverbot. Each time the interrogator inquired as to
the name of Interlocutor A, the standard response “My name is
Kim” was supplied to the interrogator. In response to questions
as to what Interlocutor A’s occupation was, the response “I’m
a psychology student here” was supplied. Finally, in response
to questions concerning where Interlocutor A was from, the
response “I’m from London” was given.
Measures
Following the interaction, the interrogator indicated on a ques-
tionnaire which of the two interlocutors (A or B) they believedwas
the real human and indicated along a 10-point scale how confident
they were that they had made the correct identification (1: not at
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FIGURE 2 | Illustration of a Turing Test scenario involving speech shadowing. This figure visually depicts the Echoborg condition in Study 1.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org May 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 6348
Corti and Gillespie A truly human interface
all confident; 10: highly confident). Interrogators also rated each
interlocutor along a 10-point scale in terms of how human-like
they seemed (1: seemed very mechanical and computer-like; 10:
seemed very human-like).
Results
In the Text Interface condition, 21 out of 21 interrogators correctly
identified Interlocutor B as being the real human, compared to
18 out of 20 interrogators in the Echoborg condition, a non-
significant difference, z = 1.49, p = 0.14 (two-tailed). There was
no significant difference between conditions in terms of how
confident interrogators were with regard to their answers, with
interrogators in the Text Interface condition reporting an average
confidence of 7.67 (SD= 2.61) and interrogators in the Echoborg
condition reporting an average confidence of 7.55 (SD = 1.70),
t(39)= 1.68, SE= 0.69, p= 0.87.
Human-likeness ratings were compared using a repeated mea-
sures analysis of variance, with Condition (Text Interface vs.
Echoborg) treated as a between-subjects factor and Interlocutor
(Interlocutor A vs. Interlocutor B) treated as a within-subjects
factor. There was a significant main effect of Interlocutor showing
that Interlocutor B was perceived as significantly more human-
like than Interlocutor A in both conditions, F(1,39) = 130.87,
r = 0.88, p < 0.001. There was also a significant interaction
between Condition and Interlocutor, F(1,39) = 7.23, r = 0.40,
p < 0.05. Independent samples means tests showed that the aver-
age human-likeness rating of Interlocutor A in the Text Interface
condition (M = 2.14, SD = 1.15) was significantly less than the
average rating in the Echoborg condition (M = 4.05, SD = 2.42),
t(39) =  3.25, SE = 0.59, p < 0.01. Meanwhile, the average
human-likeness rating of Interlocutor B in the Text Interface
condition (M = 8.76, SD = 1.51) was not significantly different
from the average rating in the Echoborg condition (M = 8.15,
SD= 1.46), t(39)= 1.32, SE= 0.46, p= 0.20.
Discussion
The interface (human body vs. text) engaged by the interrogator
made no statistically significant difference in terms of their ability
to discern which interlocutor was the real human. The chat bot,
however, was perceived by interrogators as significantly more
human-like when being shadowed by a person compared to when
simply communicating via text. This contrasted with the fact that
how human-like human interlocutors seemed to participants did
not depend on whether their words were voiced by a speech
shadower. This suggests that as the quality of an interlocutor’s
discourse capacity improves (i.e., becomesmore human) inTuring
Test scenarios, the role the interface plays in eliciting judgments
about human-likeness declines.
Study 2: A Human Imitating a Chat Bot?
Aims
Study 2 investigated whether attributing human agency to an
interlocutor is increasingly determined by the nature of the
interface as the words spoken by the interlocutor provide less
definitive evidence. We designed a scenario wherein participants
encountered an interlocutor and had to determine whether the
interlocutor was (a) a person communicating words that had been
generated by a chat bot, or (b) a person merely imitating a chat
bot, but nonetheless speaking self-authored words (the former
option always being true). The point here was to see whether
or not the interface participants encountered (human body vs.
text) influenced whether they thought their interlocutor was pro-
ducing self-authored words or, alternatively, those of a machine.
The framing of the scenario leads participants to expect that the
communication offered by their interlocutor will be abnormal,
thus the conversational limitations of chat bots are not a liability as
they are in standard Turing Test scenarios. By design, participants
must form an attribution regarding the communicative agency of
their interlocutor under conditions of ambiguity.
Research on perceptual salience suggests that people will deem
causal what is salient to them in the absence of equally salient alter-
native explanations (Jones and Nisbett, 1972; Taylor and Fiske,
1975). Dual process information evaluation theories propose that
when a person evaluates the communication and behavior of
others, stimulus ambiguity increases reliance on heuristic cues
(e.g., appearance) at the expense of more thoughtful situational
evaluation (Sager and Schofield, 1980; Devine, 1989; Chen and
Chaiken, 1999). We extrapolated from this research that when
faced with an ambiguous situation in which one’s interlocutor was
either truly speaking words generated by a chat bot or merely
pretending to be one, the interface (and thereby the heuristic cues)
salient to the participant would determine how they attributed
authorship to the words they encountered. We therefore hypoth-
esized that those who encountered an echoborg would be more
likely to see their interlocutor as producing self-authored words
(imitating a chat bot) compared to those who encountered an
interlocutor through a text interface.
Shadowers and Subjects
A female graduate student (aged 30) was trained to perform as a
speech shadower. Fifty-eight adult participants (35 female; mean
age = 25.19, SD = 9.08) were randomly assigned to one of two
conditions: Echoborg (n= 28) and Text Interface (n= 30).
Procedure
As with Study 1, Cleverbot, as well as the three stock responses
described above, were used in all trials.
The participant was led to an interaction room and instructed
by the researcher that the study involved holding a 10-min con-
versation with an interlocutor who was either (a) communicating
solely words that had been generated by a chat bot program (at no
point speaking anything self-authored), or (b) simply imitating a
chat bot program, but producing self-authoredwords nonetheless.
The researcher ensured that the distinction between these scenar-
ios was clear to the participant and gave the further instruction
that the participant would be asked following the interaction
which of the two scenarios they believed to have been the case. The
participant was informed that they were free to discuss anything
they liked with their interlocutor so long they refrained from
vulgarity.
Unlike Study 1, which had participants send messages to their
interlocutors via an instant messaging client, Study 2 featured par-
ticipants speaking aloud to their interlocutor as they would during
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any other face-to-face encounter, thereby increasing the mundane
realism of the scenario. The apparatus for this type of interaction,
however, required a means of inputting the participant’s spoken
words into the chat bot in the form of text. As we deemed speech-
to-text software to be insufficient for our purposes (being too slow
and inaccurate), we settled on a procedure wherein the researcher
(from an adjacent room) acted as the chat bot’s ears and speed
typed the participant’s words into the chat bot as they were being
spoken, paraphrasing when necessary for particularly verbose
turns. This can be conceptualized as a minimal technological
dependency format of the echoborg method (as opposed to a
full technological dependency format which would place acoustic
perception solely on technology). Although a minimal technolog-
ical dependency format adds an additional human element to the
communication loop, it ensures that accurate representations of
interactants’ words are processed by the conversational agent.
Text Interface Condition
The participant was seated in front of a computer screen which
displayed a blank instant messaging client chat window. The par-
ticipant was instructed that they were to address their interlocutor
by speaking aloud and that their interlocutor would respond via
text readable in the chat window. Once instruction was com-
plete, the researcher left the interaction room and returned to
the adjacent source room. From the source room, the researcher
overheard words spoken by the participant via a covert wireless
microphone and speed typed them into Cleverbot’s text-input
window. Cleverbot’s responses were then sent through the instant
messaging client to the participant’s screen in the interaction room
(see Figure 3).
Echoborg Condition
The participant was instructed that as soon as the researcher left
the interaction room their interlocutor would enter and sit facing
the participant (at a distance of roughly six feet). The participant
was not made aware of the fact that their interlocutor would
be wearing an earpiece and receiving messages via radio, and
the cyranoid apparatus was not visible to the participant. The
researcher then left the interaction room and returned to the adja-
cent source roomwhile the shadower entered the interaction room
and sat across from the participant. The researcher listened to the
words of the participant via a covert wireless microphone, speed
typed them into Cleverbot’s text-input window, and subsequently
spoke Cleverbot’s responses into a microphone which relayed to
the shadower’s inner-ear monitor.
Measures
Following the interaction, the participant indicated on a ques-
tionnaire whether they thought their interlocutor had truly been
producingwords generated by a chat bot programorwhether their
interlocutor was simply imitating a chat bot.
Results
Of the 30 participants in the Text Interface condition, 11 stated
following the interaction that they believed their interlocutor was
simply imitating a chat bot compared to 22 of 28 participants
in the Echoborg condition. A binary logistic regression model
showed these proportions to be significantly different from one
another, OR= 6.33, b= 1.85, SE= 0.60, p< 0.01 (indicating that
the odds of a participant in the Echoborg condition deciding their
interlocutor was imitating a chat bot were 6.33 times greater than
the odds of a participant in the Text Interface condition coming to
the same conclusion).
To gain a sense of the audio latency dynamics of echoborg
interactions involving minimal technological dependency, we
randomly selected four trials from the Echoborg condition and
measured the time between the conclusion of each interactant-
utterance and the commencement of the echoborg’s subsequent
response. The average latency was 5.15 s (SD= 3.04 s).
Discussion
Our results indicate that under conditions of ambiguity wherein
the source of an interlocutor’s verbal agency is unclear, the inter-
face substantially affects whether one attributes human agency
to the words one’s interlocutor produces. Participants who com-
municated with a chat bot via a text interface were significantly
more likely to see their interlocutor as actually producing words
generated by a chat bot compared to those who encountered
the same chat bot but through a human shadower. The results
from this study corroborate the notion that the cyranic illusion
is robust in circumstances involving extreme source-shadower
incongruity: people are biased toward perceiving an echoborg as
an autonomous person.
Our findings suggest that it is relatively easy to get a chat bot to
be perceived as an autonomous human if one is free to manipulate
the contextual frame (i.e., the social psychological context of the
interaction). An ostensibly simple suggestion from the experi-
menter (i.e., that an interlocutor might be a human imitating a
chat bot) can shift the entire contextual frame, fundamentally
altering attributions of agency. Indeed, whenever it is claimed a
certain bot has “passed the TuringTest” or some variant of Turing’s
game, it usually has less to do with advances in conversational
agent technology and more to do with shifting the contextual
frame (e.g., when the chat bot EugeneGoostman—abot that poses
as a 13-year-old Ukrainian boy with limited English skills and
general knowledge—was declared as having successfully fooled
33% of interrogators in a Turing Test in 2014; You, 2015). This,
however, raises a fundamental question: within what contextual
frame should participants encounter chat bots when we evaluate
them? Arguably, the most important frame is the most com-
mon, namely, the everyday assumption that our interlocutors are
human, just like us.
Study 3: Can Covert Echoborgs Pass as
Human in the Everyday Contextual Frame?
Aims
Study 3 examined people’s impressions following their conversing
with an agent who, unbeknownst to them, produced solely the
words of a chat bot. We aimed to gauge whether or not being
shadowed by a human improved a chat bot’s ability to pass as an
actual person within the everyday contextual frame (i.e., under
the conditions of a generic social encounter wherein it is assumed
an interlocutor is an ordinary human). The concept of “passing”
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FIGURE 3 | Illustration of interaction scenarios in Study 2 and Study 3.
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within such a frame comes from the sociological and social psy-
chological traditions that explore the mechanisms through which
people manage identities in order to be accepted as a member of
a particular group (Goffman, 1963; Renfrow, 2004; Khanna and
Johnson, 2010). For example, the anthropomorphic androids in
Dick’s (1968) novelDoAndroidsDreamof Electric Sheep?were able
to pass as human so long as they concealed their true nature, took
part in mundane human activities, and avoided the scrutiny of
bounty hunters. The speech shadower in an echoborg is essentially
a human mask placed over the peripherals one normally asso-
ciates with computer systems. From a static third-person point
of view, therefore, echoborgs appear to be autonomous human
beings and nothing more, raising the question as to whether or
not despite their communicative deficiencies people still sense
that echoborgs are ordinary people. We predicted that research
participants would not leave an interaction with a covert echoborg
with the impression of having communicated with something
non-human, whereas interacting with a covert chat bot through
a text interface would leave participants with a strong impression
of having encountered machine intelligence of some sort.
This study also investigated perceptual phenomena associated
with the uncanny valley, namely how human-like, eerie, and
familiar a covert echoborg interlocutor would seem to those with
whom they communicated, and whether or not people would be
comfortable in the presence of a covert echoborg. Mori’s (1970)
original hypothesis suggested that “subtle deviations from human
appearance and behavior create an unnerving effect” (MacDor-
man and Ishiguro, 2006b, p. 299), and our goal was to gauge
people’s reaction to an interlocutor that was human in all respects
but for the fact that a conversational agent determined the words
they spoke.
Shadowers and Subjects
A female graduate student (aged 23) was trained to perform as a
speech shadower. Forty-one adult participants (26 female; mean
age = 24.12, SD = 7.59) were randomly assigned to one of two
conditions: Echoborg (n = 20) and Text Interface (n = 21).
Procedure
In addition to Cleverbot, two other chat bots were used in this
study: Mitsuku (winner or the 2013 Loebner Prize) and Rose
(winner of the 2014 Loebner Prize). In the Echoborg condition,
Cleverbot and Rose were each assigned to speak with seven par-
ticipants while Mitsuku spoke with six participants. In the Text
Interface condition, Cleverbot, Rose, andMitsuku each spokewith
seven participants. During Cleverbot trials, the stock responses
used in the prior two studies were employed.
The participant was instructed that the study concerned how
strangers conversed when speaking for the first time, that it
involved simply holding a 10-min conversation with another
research participant, and that they were free to decide on topics
for discussion so long as vulgarity was avoided. The researcher
made no mention of chat bots or of anything related to artificial
intelligence. Furthermore, the participant was given no indication
that their interlocutor would behave non-autonomously or abnor-
mally. The aim was to invoke the everyday contextual frame, in so
far as that can be done within an experimental setting.
This study used the same minimal technological dependency
apparatus and procedure as in Study 2. In the Text Interface
condition the participant spoke aloud to their interlocutor while
their interlocutor’s responses were shown in text on a computer
screen. In the Echoborg condition the participant encountered a
human shadower face-to-face.
Measures and Post-Interaction Interview
Following the interaction the participant completed a brief ques-
tionnaire containing items asking them to indicate on a 10-point
scale how human-like (1: very mechanical and computer-like; 10:
very human-like), eerie (1: not at all eerie; 10: very eerie), and
familiar (1: not at all familiar; 10: very familiar) their interlocutor
seemed, as well as how comfortable they felt during the interaction
(1: not at all comfortable; 10: very comfortable). Participants were
also asked to briefly describe inwriting the person they spokewith
and what they thought they study was about.
When the questionnaire was completed, the researcher inter-
viewed the participant to gain a sense of their impressions of the
interaction and their interlocutor. The participant was asked to
describe salient aspects of their interlocutor’s personality. In order
to ascertain whether the participant had picked up on the fact that
they had communicated with a computer program, the researcher
asked the participant whether they had suspicions regarding the
nature of their interlocutor or about the study generally. Finally,
the researcher revealed to the participant the full nature of the
interaction and disclosed the purpose of the study.
Results
In the Text Interface condition, 14 of 21 participants (67%)
mentioned during their post-interaction interview (prior to the
researchermaking any allusion to chat bots or anything computer-
related) that they felt they had spoken to a computer program
or robot. Two participants stated during debriefing that they sus-
pected their interlocutor was a real person acting or using a script.
Furthermore, seven participants (33%) explicitly stated in writing
on their questionnaires that they believed the purpose of the study
was to assess human–computer/human–robot interaction. Of the
14 participants who did not indicate that they thought the purpose
of the study involved human–computer interaction, six said that
they thought the study concerned how strangers communicated
with one another (the stated purpose of the study supplied by
the researcher prior to the interaction). Two participants believed
the study concerned how people handle abnormal/unexpected
situations. Six participants provided unique responses that did not
fit into these categories.
Only 3 of 20 participants (15%) in the Echoborg condition
stated during their post-interaction interview that they felt as
though they had spoken to a computer or robot. Fifteen par-
ticipants made it clear to the researcher during their interview
that they suspected their interlocutor had been acting or giving
scripted responses that did not align with their actual persona.
Only two participants (10%) indicated in writing on their ques-
tionnaires that they believed the purpose of the study was to assess
human–computer/human–robot interaction. Of the 18 partici-
pants who did not indicate that they thought the study’s purpose
was to investigate human–computer interaction, only one stated
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that they thought the purpose of the study was to investigate
communication between strangers. Seven participants believed
the purpose of the study related to how people deal with abnor-
mal/unexpected situations (e.g., “how people react when thrown
out of their comfort zone” and “how people react to people who
do not comply with social norms”). Four participants believed the
study’s purpose was to see how people communicated those who
were shy/introverted. Three participants stated that they thought
the study’s purpose involved how people communicate with those
who have a disability such as autism or speech impairment. Four
participants provided other unique responses.
We performed amultivariate analysis of variance to seewhether
Interface (Echoborg vs. Text Interface) and Chat Bot (Cleverbot
vs. Mitsuku vs. Rose) produced effects on participants’ judgments
concerning the four questionnaire items that pertained to how
familiar, eerie, and human-like their interlocutor seemed as well
as how comfortable they felt during the interaction. An initial
omnibus test showed a significant effect of Interface,  = 0.73,
F(4,34)= 3.18, p< 0.05, !2 = 0.27, and a non-significant effect of
Chat Bot,= 0.74, F(8,68)= 1.41, p= 0.21, !2 = 0.14. Univariate
tests showed a significant effect of Interface on how comfortable
participants felt during the interaction, F(1,37)= 10.64, p< 0.01,
!2= 0.22, with participants in the Text Interface condition report-
ing higher levels of comfort (M = 5.52, SD = 2.42) compared
to those in the Echoborg condition (M = 3.44, SD = 2.04).
However, these univariate tests showed non-significant effects of
Interface with respect to how familiar, F(1,37) = 1.52, p = 0.23,
!2 = 0.04, eerie, F(1,37) = 0.08, p = 0.77, !2 < 0.01, and human-
like, F(1,37) = 0.24, p = 0.63, !2 = 0.01, interlocutors seemed. In
the Text Interface condition, mean scores for familiarity, eeriness,
and human-likeness were 3.81 (SD = 1.89), 6.19 (SD = 2.14),
and 2.95 (SD = 1.63), respectively, compared to scores of 3.00
(SD= 2.22), 6.00 (SD= 2.00), and 2.70 (SD= 1.78), respectively,
within the Echoborg condition.
TwoEchoborg condition trials for each chat bot were selected at
random and the audio latency was assessed. The average latencies
for Cleverbot, Mitsuku, and Rose were 4.43 s (SD= 2.92 s), 5.95 s
(SD = 3.98 s), and 3.96 s (SD = 3.94 s), respectively. As each
trial made use of the same minimal technological dependency
format of interaction, the differences between these latencies can
be accounted for by the fact that the chat bots we used differ in
terms of the speed at which they generate and return responses.
Discussion
In line with our hypothesis, a majority of participants in the Text
Interface condition sensed they were communicating with a chat
bot despite being led to believe they would be talking to another
research participant while only a small minority of participants
in the Echoborg condition came to the same conclusion. These
results suggest that a chat bot stands a far greater chance of passing
as a human in an everyday contextual framewhen being shadowed
by a human than when communicating via a text interface. The
caveat to these findings, however, is that interactants do not tend
to see a person shadowing for a chat bot as genuine. Rather,
interactants see such people as deliberately behaving outside of
their normal persona. This finding corroborates the general phe-
nomenon observed in Study 2, that people are inclined to perceive
an echoborg as somebody acting but nonetheless speaking self-
authored words. We should note, however, that participants’
awareness of being in a laboratory study may have contributed
to their suspecting that the persona they encountered was not
genuine. Future research may include observational field studies
wherein interactants encounter a covert echoborg in real-world
social contexts (e.g., a generic social gathering). It is plausible that
in such scenarios interactants would be less inclined to form the
belief that an echoborg was someone deliberately acting outside of
their normal persona.
Although our experiment only considered two types of inter-
faces as opposed to a continuum of interfaces ranging from the
very-human to the very-mechanical, our results contribute a novel
finding to the discussion surroundinguncanny valley phenomena.
We found evidence that people feel significantly less comfortable
speaking to a chat bot through a human speech shadower than
they do speaking to the same chat bot through a text interface.
General discomfort seemed to derive from the social awkward-
ness that arose due to the chat bot’s violations of conversational
norms. The effect of these violations appears to have been mag-
nified in the Echoborg condition. It is likely that participants
in the Echoborg condition held higher expectations about the
level of understanding and rapport that would be reached and
sustained during the interactions on account of their speaking
face-to-face with another human being, for the physical body of
the other is laden with social cues that evoke such expectations
(Kiesler, 2005). Komatsu and Yamada’s (2011) “adaptation gap”
hypothesis suggests that when expectations are not met during
interactions with agents (e.g., when the implied social capacity
of an agent exceeds that actually experienced by a user), people’s
subjective impressions are affected. Accordingly, participants in
the Echoborg condition may have felt more uncomfortable com-
pared to their counterparts in the Text Interface condition partly
due to their having higher pre-interaction expectations about the
quality of interlocution they would experience. What requires
further study is the investigation of conditions within which par-
ticipants are told prior to interacting with either an echoborg or a
text interface that their interlocutor will be producing the words
of a chat bot. Adding two such conditions to Study 30s design
would allow one to observe whether the body of the other pro-
duces effect on feelings of comfort independent of pre-interaction
expectations.
General Discussion
We have introduced and demonstrated a new research method,
a special type of cyranoid we call an echoborg. Echoborgs make
possible interactionswith artificial conversational agents that have
truly human interfaces. Though an abundance of research has
demonstrated various means of embodying machine intelligence
in human form, from onscreen embodied conversational agents
(e.g., Cassell et al., 2000; Krämer et al., 2009) to 3D agents in
immersive virtual environments (e.g., Selvarajah and Richards,
2005; Bailenson et al., 2008) to tangible machine-bodied androids
(e.g., Ishiguro andNishio, 2007; Spexard et al., 2007), the echoborg
stands apart from these other methods in that it involves a real,
tangible human as the interface.
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Study 1 compared a standard text-based version of the Tur-
ing Test to an echoborg version and found that although a chat
bot’s ability to pass a Turing Test was not improved when being
shadowed by a human, being shadowed did increase ratings of
how human-like the chat bot seemed. This effect of embodi-
ment on human-likeness was unique to chat bot interlocutors,
as human interlocutors in these tests were not seen as more
human-like when their words were spoken by a human shadower,
suggesting that a demonstrated capacity for human-level dialog
may override the effect of human embodiment on perceptions
of human-likeness in Turing Test contexts. Study 2 showed that
in an ambiguous situation wherein participants were told that an
interlocutor was either articulating words generated by a chat bot
or merely imitating one, participants in a text interface condition
were more likely to conclude that they had encountered the words
of an actual chat bot than those who encountered an echoborg.
The contrast between these two conditions provides evidence for
(a) the robustness of the cyranic illusion, and (b) the notion that
people’s causal attributions align with what is most salient and
least ambiguous to them. Study 3 explored the notion of passing
and the uncanny valley in an ordinary, everyday contextual frame
(i.e., the experimental context attempted to simulate a generic,
unscripted, first-time encounter between strangers). Participants
engaged with a covert chat bot via either a text interface or an
echoborg.When interviewed following these interactions, most of
the participants who engaged a text interface suspected they had
encountered a chat bot, whereas only a few of the participants who
engaged an echoborg held the same suspicion. This suggests that it
is possible for a chat bot to pass as fully human given the requisite
interface, namely an actual human body, and a suitable contextual
frame. This study also found that people were less comfortable
speaking to an echoborg than to a text interface.
Implications
Android Science
Drawing from Nunamaker et al.’s (2011) distinction between vir-
tual avatars and embodied conversational agents, in Figure 4
we visualize a simple two-dimensional matrix differentiating the
basic tools available to android science, with one dimension indi-
cating the source of verbal (and potentially non-verbal) agency
and the other indicating interface-type. This matrix places the
echoborg in relation to current mechanical devices utilized by
android researchers (autonomous and tele-operated androids) as
well as human beings as experimental subjects. By juxtaposing the
field’s tools in this manner, we can begin formally distinguishing
the unique research questions that lend themselves to each. The
fundamental question that each of these tools can be applied to
FIGURE 4 | Basic tools of android science.
concernswhat happenswhen the human elements of an interlocu-
tor are removed and replaced by artificial imitations. The unique
questions that can be approached via the usage of echoborgs
concern how real human bodies (notmeremechanical imitations)
fundamentally alter people’s perceptions of and interactions with
machine intelligence.
In the echoborg paradigm, the communicative limitations of
chat bots and other types of conversational agents are not treated
as problematic barriers to fluid conversation. Rather, these lim-
itations are directly operationalized; how the human body as
an interface mediates the perception of these communicative
limitations is what is of interest. We can thus differentiate the
echoborg paradigm from the tele-operated android paradigm
in the following manner. Tele-operated android research tar-
gets the social dynamics between humans and human-like
machine interfaces. Given that conversational agents are relatively
poor communicators, the tele-operated paradigm cedes speech-
interpretation/generation responsibility to a human operator,
whose experiences operating an android can also be the subject
of inquiry. By contrast, the echoborg paradigm is interested in
the social dynamics that emerge when the words artificial systems
produce are refracted through actual human bodies during face-
to-face interaction.
The affordance which grants the echoborg particular promise
as a methodology is that it allows researchers the opportunity to
study interactions under conditions wherein people believe they
are speaking to an autonomously communicating person. The
echoborg can interact covertly (i.e., without interactants expecting
that they are communicating with a bot). Of course, chat bots
and other conversational agents can be deployed covertly via
traditional text interfaces—and many are (e.g., posing as real
people in chat rooms, web forums, and social media websites
in order to distribute marketing messages and collect user-data;
Gianvecchio et al., 2011; Nowak, 2012). But as Study 3 shows,
focused interaction with a covert chat bot via a text interface for a
sustained period of time is very likely to result in the interactant
sensing that that they are not speaking to an actual person. Today’s
chat bots simply fail to sustainmeaningfulmixed-initiative dialog,
and unless their words are vocalized by a tangible human body,
their true nature is quickly exposed.
The Turing Test Paradigm (and Passing)
Over half a century since its conception, the Turing Test paradigm
remains a substantial area of interest in artificial intelligence and
philosophy ofmind. The usefulness of the Turing Test as a techno-
logical benchmark, its rules, andwhat it wouldmean for amachine
to pass such a test (i.e., what, exactly, passing would be evidence
of) are issues that have been hotly debated (e.g., Searle, 1980;
Copeland, 2000; French, 2000; Harnad, 2000; Chomsky, 2008;
Watt, 2008; Proudfoot, 2011). The non-philosophical literature on
the Turing Test focuses largely on the technological aspects of can-
didate conversational agents (e.g., whether they occasionallymake
spelling mistakes) and the conditions that give rise to increased
fooling (e.g., knowing vs. not knowing of the possible presence
of a machine intelligence; Saygin and Cicekli, 2002; Gilbert and
Forney, 2015).What remains to be explored in sufficient depth are
the social psychological dynamics within standard and modified
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Turing Test scenarios: causal attributions, identity and power
relationships, questions asked and avoided, misunderstandings
recognized and repaired, intersubjective achievement, and so on
(e.g., Warwick and Shah, 2015). Our position is that the Turing
Test is most useful when its orthodox interpretation is relaxed and
it is applied not toward assessing the capacities of chat bots per se,
but toward investigating aspects of human social nature. Indeed,
the chat bot itself may be the least interesting element within a
Turing Test scenario. A chat bot can be made to fool a human
interrogator if the expectations of the interrogator are manipu-
lated (e.g., through ambiguous framing). What is interesting is
exploring the ways in which the chat bot’s utterances interact with
the interrogator’s expectations, all within a particular contextual
frame, so as to produce a social interaction that feels more or less
comfortable or human.
In essence, the three studies we have presented are all modified
Turing Tests in that they explore passing in one form or another
(with Study 1 bearing the closest resemblance to Turing’s original
concept). What our studies show is how intimately connected
passing is to the social psychological framing of an interaction,
and how the interface one communicates with affects themeaning
of the situation from the point-of-view of interactants. In our
own view, the results from Study 3 are at the same time the
most profound and the least surprising. Seventeen of 20 people
spoke face-to-face with an echoborg in a small room for 10-min
and failed to develop even the slightest suspicion that they were
interacting with the words of an artificial agent of some kind.
They may have seen their interlocutor as strange, introverted, or
even acting, but it did not cross their minds that who (or what)
they were dealing with was part computer program. This makes
sense in light of how we experience mundane human interaction,
and implies that, given certain generic social psychological pre-
conditions, an interlocutor’s capacity to produce sophisticated or
even sensible syntax simply does not factor in to our categorizing
them as a human being or as having a “mind.” That is to say,
rather than taking these results as indicating the sophistication
of chat bots, we take these results as indicating the importance
of both the body and social psychological framing in social
interaction.
Future Research Applications
Creating human-like interfaces that totally override people’s
awareness that they are interacting with something artificial
remains a distant holy grail (Vogeley and Bente, 2010). In the
interim, however, we can use echoborgs to approximate the condi-
tions of a world in whichmachines are capable of passing the non-
verbal and motor requirements of a Total Turing Test. This opens
the doors to a new frontier of human–robot and human–agent
interaction research.
Echoborgs can be used to further study uncanny valley phe-
nomena. Most of the literature that has explored the uncanny
valley has focused on motor behavior and physical resemblance
as independent variables, as well as the effects different levels of
participant engagement (passive vs. active) have on perceptions
of agents (e.g., von der Pütten et al., 2011). Researchers have also,
but to a lesser extent, looked at the role of phonetic quality in
relation to the uncanny valley (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2011; Tinwell
et al., 2011). Echoborgs enable us to study uncanny valley phe-
nomena isolating dialogic capacity as an independent variable.
Using echoborgs, we can see if an uncanny valley emerges when
a spectrum of conversational agents ranging from the very poor
(machine-like) to the very advanced (human-like) are communi-
cated through a human speech shadower in unscripted face-to-
face interactions.
Another possible avenue of research concerns the use
echoborgs in comparative person perception studies. Experiments
can be designed with conditions differentiated in terms of the
interface through which participants communicate with a
particular conversational agent (text interface, embodied
conversational agent, echoborg, and so on). Researchers could
then observe how the various interfaces shape aspects of the
personality perceived by the participant, from minimal interfaces
all the way up to a face-to-face human body.
A particularly enticing possibility for future research involves
developing bots that simultaneously dictate words to a shadower
while directing elements of the shadower’s motor behavior. In
the echoborgs we have thus far constructed, the bot supplies the
speech shadower with what to say while the shadower retains
full control over their non-verbal functioning. We can imagine,
however, developing a bot that delivered to the shadower’s left
ear monitor words to speak while delivering basic behavioral
commands (e.g., “smile,” “stand up,” “extend right hand for hand-
shake”) to the shadower’s right ear monitor. This would grant the
bot greater agency over the echoborg’s behavior.
The exciting opportunity opened up by echoborgs more gen-
erally is the opportunity to study human–computer interaction
under the conditions of face-to-face human–human interaction.
The problem for human–computer interaction research in gen-
eral, and android science in particular, is that humans approach
human–computer interaction differently from human–human
interaction (as our own research shows). Human–human inter-
action triggers a huge range of complex phenomena, from
identity dynamics to social emotions to basic taken-for-granted
assumptions to an incredibly subtle intersubjective orientation to
the other (Gillespie and Cornish, 2014). The echoborg method
enables us to test conversational agents within face-to-face inter-
action scenarios, simultaneously pushing AI into a new domain
and also to probing the full complexity of the human–human
inter-face.
Ethical Considerations
In exploring social contexts involving a covert echoborg, mild
deception is required in order to preserve the participant’s belief
that they are encountering an autonomous person. Careful exper-
imental design (e.g., choice of conversational agents and shad-
owers, duration of interaction, communicative setting, etc.) and
thorough piloting of procedures is strongly recommended so as
to render participant distress unlikely. Participants should be
exhaustively debriefed to gauge whether or not adjustments need
to be made to the research procedures in order to avoid potential
negative experiences. As a guideline, the debrief procedure in
Study 3 involved asking the participant if they had any concerns
regarding the ethics of the study as well as if they would object to
a close friend or relative taking part in the same study under the
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same conditions. All participants said no to both questions. We
can anecdotally report that all of our participants enjoyed taking
part in our research, with many expressing positivity toward the
echoborg concept during debriefing and linking their experiences
with what they had seen in popular science fiction films.
Limitations
Our studies were highly exploratory in nature. As such, vari-
ous aspects of our investigations could have been more finely
controlled. Though best attempts were made to standardize the
body language of shadowers across all experimental trials, we did
not make specific considerations for controlling certain behaviors
(in particular, consistency of eye-contact). Moreover, the identity
features of the shadowers (e.g., gender, ethnicity, age, and so on)
may have produced unobserved effects on participants. We did
not formally investigate such effects as they were not deemed
to be of theoretical interest; however, we do acknowledge that
questions regarding the relationship between the physical identity
of the shadower and the social perception of the echoborg warrant
future investigation. Sample sizes in our studies were relatively
small due to practical constraints. Had our sample size for Study 3
been larger we might have been able to conduct a comprehensive
comparison between the three chat bots used (Cleverbot, Rose,
and Mitsuku). Also, we disclose that our choice of chat bots was
based on prior familiarity with these programs.
We did not systematically analyze the effects audio latency
may have had on participants’ experiences. The delay between
interactant-utterances and echoborg-responses in the studies that
involved participants speaking aloud to an echoborg certainly
degraded the mundane realism of interactions to some degree.
Minimizing this latency is amajor research priority as we continue
to refine the echoborg methodology. At the moment we face a
trade-off between speed and accuracy: the use of a speed-typing
third party (the minimal technological dependency model) slows
the pace at which the conversational agent receives the words
spoken by the interactant, yet better guarantees that the agent will
process an accurate representation of the interactant’s words.
Conclusion
This article has demonstrated the possibility and potential of
echoborgs: human-bodied entities whose words (and potentially
motor actions) are partially or completely determined by a com-
puter program. Researchers can use echoborgs to study how
people interact face-to-face with machine intelligence under the
assumption that it is human. This methodology opens up a new
paradigm for human–computer interaction research as to date
people have interacted with computers, even sophisticated agents
and highly lifelike androids, as machines (i.e., as things cate-
gorically different from real humans). Pairing a conversational
agent with a human being to create an echoborg fundamentally
transforms how people perceive and emotionally experience an
in person encounter with social technology. Perhaps the most
exciting takeaway from this initial examination of echoborgs is
that under certain social psychological conditions echoborgs pass
as fully autonomous human beings.
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